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“To Comply or Not To Comply?” An
Argument in Favor of Increasing Investigation
and Enforcement of MARPOL Annex I
Violations
Katriel Statman
Abstract
The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78)
seek to protect the world’s oceans from environmental harms. Traditional
maritime law, principles of international law, and difficulties in detecting
violations of MARPOL 73/78 have made it difficult for nations to enforce
the strict requirements regarding oil pollution under Annex I. In light of
these difficulties, the United States authorities have used other means under
United States law to prosecute these violations. This note argues that while
the United States’ increased enforcement is controversial it is necessary in
order to ensure that MARPOL 73/78 is effective and to protect the world’s
oceans from environmental disaster.
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I. Introduction
When the words “oil,” “pollution,” and “ocean” are put together, an
instant mental reaction is to think of the Deepwater Horizon events of 2010
or the Exxon-Valdez event of 1989.1 Yet tremendous disasters such as these
do not generate the majority of oil pollution in our world’s oceans today.2
The vast majority of ocean oil pollution comes from discharges of oil and
oily mixtures from shipping operations.3 Even though these discharges
violate the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships (taken together,
MARPOL),4 compliance with the provisions of the treaty is poor.5
1.
See Andrew Griffin, MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or
Half Empty?, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489, 489–90 (1994) (discussing the
accessibility and newsworthy nature of large disasters such as Exxon Valdez compared to
operational discharges).
2.
See David P. Kehoe, United States v. Abrogar: Did the Third Circuit Miss the
Boat?, 39 ENVTL L. 1, 3 (Winter 2009) (comparing the volume of oil from the Exxon Valdez
spill with the annual volume of oil discharged from daily operations).
3.
See id. (explaining the vast amount of oil dumped in the ocean is from operation of
large vessels).
4.
See International Conference on Marine Pollution: Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319 [hereinafter MARPOL 73] (laying out
operating requirements for shipping).
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Over the past twenty years, the United States has increased
enforcement of violations of MARPOL, as codified in the Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships (APPS).6 The United States has received criticism
both for the practice of using whistleblowers as an investigatory tool and
for aggressively prosecuting MARPOL violators.7 If oil pollution in the
world’s oceans is to be eradicated, the United States must increase
enforcement against the companies that own, operate, and have direct
control over shipping and transportation in the oceans.
This Note considers whether increased enforcement of MARPOL
and APPS is effective and has been an effective tool in the attempt to
eradicate or reduce oil pollution from our oceans. Part II addresses the
history, background, and litigation surrounding MARPOL and the APPS in
the United States. Part III asks whether a large whistleblower award is an
effective tool, whether the United States is violating principles of
international law, and which parties should prosecute MARPOL violations.
The final part of this Note examines a number of different options regarding
solutions to increase enforcement of MARPOL, and argues that an
increased use of the whistleblower provisions, increased penalties for
MARPOL violators, and mandatory whistleblower awards are necessary to
further incentivize voluntary compliance and promote the goals of
MARPOL.

5.
See MAR. TRANSP. COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COST SAVINGS
STEMMING FROM NON-COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN
THE MARITIME SECTOR
4 (2003) [hereinafter COST SAVINGS] available at
http://www.oecd.org/sti/transport/maritimetransport/2496757.pdf (noting that “compliance
with international environmental rules still leaves something to be desired”) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
6.
See Nicholas H. Berg, Note, Bringing It All Back Home: The Fifth and Second
Circuits Allow Domestic Prosecutions for Oil Record Book Violations on Foreign-Flagged
Vessels, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 253, 254 (2009) (explaining that the United States has increased
MARPOL enforcement by focusing on the requirement that Oil Record Books are accurate);
see also Michael G. Chalos & Wayne A. Parker, The Criminalization of Maritime Accidents
and MARPOL Violations in the United States, 23 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 206, 209–10 (2010–11)
(explaining that the United States has increased prosecutions of crewmembers, vessel
owners, and managers).
7.
See Berg, supra note 6, at 254–55 (explaining that clients are being warned
globally of the potential increases in liability exposure); see also Chalos & Parker, supra
note 6, at 209–10 (explaining that the United States pursues an aggressive prosecutorial style
for deliberate violations of environmental laws and regulations).
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II. Background

A. History of the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
In the 1950s, the British government was concerned with ocean oil
pollution because it had started to encroach on the British coast.8 In 1954,
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution in the Sea by
Oil (OILPOL 54)9 was drafted and implemented by the thirty-two countries
responsible for the majority of merchant shipping tonnage in the world.10
“[OILPOL 54] prohibited the discharge from any tanker of oil and oily
mixtures of more than 100 parts per million, and established prohibition
zones extending 50 miles from the shoreline in which intentional discharges
were totally prohibited.”11
In 1962 and 1969, OILPOL 54 underwent significant amendments
due to poor enforcement and the lack of available technology required for
compliance.12 The 1962 amendments enlarged the prohibition zones and
prohibited any vessel that was 20,000 tons or greater from discharging oil
or “oily mixtures.”13 Due to a lack of incentives for ship owners to use the
available technology to separate oil from bilge water and use on-shore
reception facilities, the 1962 amendments failed to effectively increase
compliance.14 The 1969 amendments allowed ships to use a load-on-top
procedure to separate oil from bilge water.15 Because the load-on-top

8.
See 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 209 (4th ed.
2004) (discussing the United Kingdom’s response to oil pollution by calling a convention in
1954).
9.
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution in the Sea by Oil, May
12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OILPOL 54].
10.
See COLIN DE LA RUE & CHARLES B. ANDERSON, SHIPPING AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND PRACTICE 759 (1998) (explaining the history of the international
treaties governing oil pollution).
11.
Id.
12.
See id. at 760–61 (explaining that a poor record of enforcement and lack of
available technology led to a conference to amend OILPOL 54).
13.
See Andrew Schulkin, Safe Harbors: Crafting an International Solution to Cruise
Ship Pollution, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 111 (2002) (“Oily bilge water is oilcontaminated water produced by a cruise ship’s engines, steam systems, evaporator dumps,
and other components.”).
14.
See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760 (discussing the shortfalls of
the 1962 amendments to OILPOL 54 and the need for more amendments).
15.
See Griffin, supra note 1, at 492 (describing load-on-top as “a procedure in which
operational waters are allowed to settle during the voyage back to the loading port,” giving
oil and water time to separate so the water can be siphoned off, after which new cargo can be
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procedure was too difficult to use and implement, it also failed to
significantly reduce oil pollution.16
In 1973 an International Conference was held to bring OILPOL 54
in line with modern tanker practices and operations.17 This conference
produced the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL 73).18 MARPOL 73 was the first comprehensive regime
that aimed to completely eradicate the intentional pollution of the oceans by
oil and other harmful substances,19 including noxious liquid substances
carried in bulk, harmful substances carried in package form, sewage,
garbage, and air pollution.20
In 1978 another convention was convened to address the high costs
and mandatory requirements of MARPOL 73.21 The Protocol of 1978
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL 78)22 was adopted and allowed any state that ratified
MARPOL 78 to automatically ratify MARPOL 73.23 MARPOL 78 included
more stringent requirements for oil management and discharges during
daily ship operations.24
President Jimmy Carter signed MARPOL 73/78 in 1978, and the
United States Senate ratified the treaty in 1980.25 MARPOL 73/78 is not a

“‘loaded on top’ of the oily slop”); see also DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760
(discussing the changes to OILPOL 54 required to promote compliance).
16.
See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760–61 (discussing the difficulties
that the 1969 amendments to OILPOL 54 faced); see also Griffin, supra note 1, at 492 (“The
difficulty with LOT is that in order to be effective it requires a skilled and conscientious
crew to follow the correct procedures. Also, since the separation process takes considerable
time, LOT does not work well for short coastal voyages.”).
17.
See id. (explaining the history of MARPOL 73).
18.
See id. at 761–71 (summarizing the results of the 1973 Convention); see generally
MARPOL 73, supra note 4 (laying out the agreement produced at the 1973 convention).
19.
See id. at 760–61 (noting the importance of MARPOL 73 to international law).
20.
See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annexes II VI (governing these forms of
pollution).
21.
See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 765–71 (discussing changes and
additions to MARPOL 73).
22.
See Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter MARPOL 78] (revising
the regulations provided by MARPOL 73).
23.
See id. art. I(2) (incorporating MARPOL 73 and MARPOL 78 into a single
instrument); see also DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra, note 10, at 765 (discussing the
process for adoption of MARPOL 78).
24.
See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 765–71 (noting some of the
changes that MARPOL 78 made to MARPOL 73).
25.
See 126 CONG. REC. 18, 492–93 (July 2, 1980) (voting to ratify MARPOL 78); 2
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 240 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing
the United States legislative history with respect to MARPOL 78).

256

5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 251 (2013)

self-executing treaty26 and became part of United States law when the Act
to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) was enacted in 1980.27 The APPS
repealed the United States implementing legislation for OILPOL 54.28 The
treaty came into force in 1983 when, “twelve months after the date on
which not less than fifteen states, the combined merchant fleets of which
constitute not less than 50 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s
merchant shipping, have become parties to it in accordance with Article
IV.”29 MARPOL has been signed and ratified by 152 countries,
representing ninety-nine percent of the world’s shipping tonnage.30
B. Relevant Provisions of MARPOL 73/78 and the APPS
The APPS applies to ships that operate under the authority of the
United States, and with respect to Annexes I and II, any ship within the
navigable waters of the United States.31 Under Annex I, the United States
has jurisdiction to enforce all violations of MARPOL/APPS within the
navigable waters of the United States.32 The navigable waters of the United
States for APPS are defined as the territorial waters of the United States,
reaching out to twelve nautical miles.33 The United States may prosecute
any United States flagged ship for MARPOL violations.34

26.
See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“When the stipulations are
not self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into
effect, and such legislation is as much subject to modification and repeal by congress as
legislation upon any other subject.”).
27.
See Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1907(a) (2011) (declaring
violations of MARPOL unlawful).
28.
See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 781 n.58 (stating that APPS
repealed OILPOL 54 in the United States).
29.
MARPOL 78, supra note 22, art. V.
30.
See INT’L MAR. ORG., STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS
IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS SECRETARYGENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS 108-12 (2013) [hereinafter STATUS OF
CONVENTIONS],
available
at:
MULTILATERAL
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20%202013.pdf (listing each nation that has signed and ratified MARPOL 78 and the number
and percentage of nations that are a party to MARPOL 78) (on file with the WASHINGTON
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
31.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1902 (providing the jurisdictional requirements of the APPS).
32.
See MARPOL 78, supra note 22 (providing each nation with the authority to
prosecute MARPOL violations that occur within their own territorial waters).
33.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(7) (defining “navigable waters” as defined in Presidential
Proclamation 5928 of December 27, 1988); Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec.
27, 1988) (defining the territorial sea as extending out to twelve nautical miles).
34.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(1) (providing jurisdiction for prosecutions of all United
States flagged ships “wherever located”).
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The Secretary of Defense is authorized to inspect the discharge of a
harmful substance in violation of MARPOL by any ship that is at a port or
terminal within United States control.35 Any prosecution for an illegal
discharge by a foreign or United States flagged ship within the United
States territory is subject to principles of comity, international law, and
maritime law.36
[I]f the violation is by a ship registered in or of the
nationality of a country party to the MARPOL protocol . . .
or one operated under the authority of a country party to
the MARPOL protocol, . . . the Administrator . . . may refer
the matter to the government of the country of the ship’s
registry or nationality, or under whose authority the ship is
operating for appropriate action.37
Taken together, these provisions give the United States both discretionary
enforcement powers and an obligation to abide by international law.
A discharge must meet specific requirements to avoid violating
MARPOL/APPS.38 An oil tanker may not discharge oil or oily mixtures
within fifty nautical miles of the nearest land from a cargo bilge unless the
discharge does not exceed fifteen ppm.39 In general discharges may not
exceed fifteen ppm under MARPOL Regulations 12–16.40
To combat the difficulty of monitoring discharges on the high seas,
Regulation 20 requires maintenances of an Oil Record Book (ORB).41 The
35.
See § 1903 (providing the authority to promulgate regulations under APPS);
§ 1904(c)(2) (subjecting such ships to inspection while under US jurisdiction).
36.
See § 1912 (requiring any application of APPS to comply with international law);
§ 1902(i) (including savings clause resolving inconsistencies with maritime or customary
international law).
37.
33 U.S.C. § 1908(f) (emphasis added).
38.
See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 15 (providing the specific
discharge requirements of MARPOL); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, Annex I, Regulation 15
(leaving unchanged the corresponding regulation from MARPOL 73); see also DE LA RUE &
ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760–63 (discussing MARPOL restrictions on vessel discharges
in operation).
39.
See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 34 (providing the specific
discharge requirements of MARPOL); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, Annex I, Regulation 34
(leaving unchanged the corresponding regulation from MARPOL 73).
40.
See MARPOL 78, supra note 22, Annex I, Regulations 12–16 (prohibiting any
discharge that exceeds fifteen parts per million); see also Michael G. Chalos & Wayne A.
Parker, The Criminalization of Maritime Accidents and MARPOL Violations in the United
States, 23 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 206, 212–13 (2010–11) (discussing oil discharge requirements
under MARPOL, APPS, and United States regulations).
41.
See MARPOL 78, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulations 17, 36 (requiring that all
discharges by ships are accurately recorded in an ORB).
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ORB must be maintained accurately and kept for three years.42 It must have
a record of any discharge of oil or oily mixtures as permitted under
Regulation 11 or any accidental or exceptional discharge of oil or oily
mixtures that is not covered by a Regulation 11 exception.43 Failure to
maintain an ORB is a violation of MARPOL.44 Under MARPOL and the
APPS the failure to maintain an accurate ORB can lead to a criminal
penalty.45 If the inspection and the investigation of the supposed discharge
of harmful substances leads to a criminal penalty, up to one half of the fine
may be awarded to the person who gave information that lead to the
conviction.46
C. Process of Enforcement
While all investigations and violations have their own natures, the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jho described how MARPOL
investigations often occur.47 In Jho, the U.S. Coast Guard searched the M/T
Pacific Ruby while the ship was in Port Neches, Texas.48 Based on a tip
from one of the Pacific Ruby’s engineers, the Coast Guard investigated both
an unlawful discharge of oil and the manipulation of pollution detection
equipment by Chief Engineer Jho.49
The Coast Guard has the statutory authority to:
[M]ake inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over
42.
See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 17 (specifying prompt
recording and retention requirements); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, at Annex I, Regulation
17 (adopting the corresponding regulation from MARPOL 73 with a technical amendment).
43.
See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 17 (describing each type of
discharge that must be recorded in the ORB); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, at Annex I,
Regulation 17(adopting the corresponding regulation from MARPOL 73 with a technical
amendment).
44.
See MARPOL 73, supra note 4, Annex I, Regulation 17 (imposing the
bookkeeping requirement); id. Art. 4 (deeming noncompliance a violation and providing for
penalties); MARPOL 78, supra note 22, Art. I (incorporating the operative provisions of
MARPOL 73).
45.
See Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (2012) (making a
knowing violation of MARPOL to be a class D felony).
46.
See id. at § 1908(b)(2) (allowing a whistleblower to collect an award from the
damages awarded against the MARPOL violator).
47.
See generally United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that Jho
could be held liable for failure to maintain an accurate ORB even though the discharge at
issue did not occur in the United States’ navigable waters).
48.
See id. at 400 (discussing the events that led to Jho’s prosecution).
49.
See id. (discussing the Coast Guard’s reasons for investigating Jho and the M/T
Pacific Ruby).
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which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention,
detection, and suppression of violations of the laws of the
United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant,
and petty officers may at any time go on board of any
vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any
law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on
board, examine the ship’s documents and papers, and
examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all
necessary force to compel compliance.50
The Coast Guard needs to show only a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to survive a Fourth Amendment challenge for unwarranted search
and seizure.51
During the investigation the Coast Guard discussed the ORB
entries with both Jho and the ship’s captain.52 Initially the Coast Guard
determined that there was no violation; however, they later obtained
corroborating evidence of MARPOL violations.53 The government
eventually brought charges against Jho for eight counts of knowing failure
to maintain an oil record book as required by 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) and 33
C.F.R. § 151.25.54
If a ship is either liable for a fine or a civil liability or if there is
reasonable cause to believe that a ship, its owner, operator, chief engineer,
or someone in charge is subject to such liability, the Secretary of the
Treasury, on request of the Secretary of Defense, may keep the ship in port
by revoking the ship’s clearance to leave.55 In such cases, the ship is often
retained in the port where the violation was found pending court
proceedings.56
50.
14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (emphasis added).
51.
See United States v. Varlack Ventures, Inc., 149 F.3d 212, 216–17 (3d Cir. 1998)
(discussing the requirements that the Coast Guard must fulfill in order to a search a vessel
without a warrant).
52.
See Jho, 534 F.3d at 400 (discussing the Coast Guard’s investigation of the M/T
Pacific Ruby).
53.
See id. at 400–01 (discussing the Coast Guard’s actions after the initial
investigation).
54.
See id. at 401 (describing the charges that were brought against Jho for his failure
to properly maintain an accurate ORB).
55.
See 46 U.S.C. § 60105 (2011) (requiring vessels to receive permission from the
Secretary of Homeland Security before leaving a United States Port); see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1908(e) (2008) (allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to revoke the clearance required
under 46 U.S.C. § 60105 for a ship to leave a United States port if under investigation or
suspicion of a MARPOL violation).
56.
See generally Giuseppe Bottiglieri Shipping Co. S.P.A. v. United States, 843 F.
Supp. 2d 1241, 1244–45 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (discussing the retention of plaintiff’s vessel in
port pending the proceedings for APPS violations and the failure of the Coast Guard to
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When the Coast Guard receives information from a whistleblower,
the court will provide the whistleblower with an attorney to represent the
whistleblower’s interests in the proceeding against the violator.57 The
whistleblower is sequestered from the rest of the ship’s crew at the expense
of the ship-owner or lessor pending proceedings.58
A whistleblower may recover up to one half of the award against
the MARPOL violator in both civil and criminal proceedings.59 If the
penalty imposed against the violator is a criminal penalty, then the
whistleblower award is granted at the court’s discretion.60 If the penalty is a
civil penalty, then the whistleblower award is granted at the discretion of
the Secretary of Defense or the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency depending on whether the Secretary or the
Administrator has found that a party violated MARPOL.61
If the whistleblower award arises out of a criminal prosecution and
is a matter of the court’s discretion, then the whistleblower will be required
to petition the court separately to receive the statutorily permitted award.62
Whistleblowers will often be required to retain counsel to petition for their
award.63 Moreover, mere judgment against a MARPOL violator does not
guarantee that the whistleblower will receive any part of the penalty
assessed.64 This places the whistleblower in a difficult position: The
whistleblower has not worked since the proceeding began, has likely lost
negotiate for Giuseppe to have permission to leave); see also Benedict S. Gullo, The Illegal
Discharge of Oil on the High Seas: The U.S. Coast Guard’s Ongoing Battle Against Vessel
Polluters and a New Approach Towards Establishing Environmental Compliance, 209 MIL.
L. REV. 122, 158 (discussing the procedures for investigations into APPS violations).
57.
See United States v. Overseas Shipholding Grp., Inc., 625 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010)
(describing that when the grand jury proceedings against Overseas Shipholding Group had
begun, the magistrate judge appointed an attorney to Barroso, the whistleblower, to represent
Barroso’s interests in the proceedings against Overseas Shipholding Group).
58.
See Chalos & Parker, supra note 6, at 234–35 (criticizing the Coast Guard’s
aggressive use of 33 U.S.C. § 1908(e) to detain ships and 18 U.S.C. § 3144 authorizing the
government to temporarily detain material witnesses at their employers expense).
59.
See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a)–(b) (2011) (allowing whistleblowers to recover
at the discretion of the court, the Secretary of Defense, or the Administrator of the EPA up to
one half of the award issued against the MARPOL violator).
60.
See id. § 1908(a) (establishing that the court has discretion to provide the
whistleblower with an award when the case is criminal).
61.
See id. § 1908(b) (establishing that the Secretary of Defense or the Administrator
of the EPA has discretion to grant a whistleblower award in civil cases).
62.
See Overseas Shipholding Grp., Inc., 625 F.3d at 5 (discussing the potential
difficulty that Barroso would face in securing his right to the whistleblower award).
63.
See, e.g., id. (discussing Barroso’s retention of counsel).
64.
See Anderson v. United States, 2012 WL 6087283, *5 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Even if
the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of
his due process rights. Plaintiff has not shown that he has a property right in the portion of
the penalty that he seeks because the award is discretionary.”).
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his or her job, and may find it difficult to attain new work in the maritime
industry.65 Therefore, while a whistleblower may receive a windfall, a
whistleblower also faces substantial risks.66
D. Environmental Impact of Oil Bilge and Sewage Dumping in the World’s
Oceans
The issue of ocean oil pollution was largely ignored until OILPOL
54 sixty years ago.67 The majority of ocean oil pollution is the result of
daily operational ship discharges.68 Yet, public reaction and contempt for
oil pollution is generally not voiced until major catastrophic events like the
recent catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico at the Macondo well.69
Coast Guard Lieutenant Benedict Gullo noted the vastness of the
oil pollution problem in our oceans:
Each year up to 810,000 tons of oil waste are intentionally
and illegally dumped into the world’s oceans by
commercial vessels. As a consequence, seabird populations
are reduced, the habitats for slow-moving shellfish such as
clams, oysters, and mussels are poisoned, and fish—if not
killed by harmful toxins of the oil—lose the ability to
reproduce, reproduce deformed offspring, or upon
ingestion of the oil create even more toxic substances.70
Oil pollution harms the whole ocean environment, but is particularly
harmful to seabirds.71 The oil from ship discharges damages the water
65.
See id. at *1 (discussing Anderson’s statements to United States authorities that he
was putting his job at risk merely by talking to them); see also Overseas Shipholding Grp.,
Inc., 625 F.3d at 9 (arguing that the reason for the whistleblower award is to create
incentives when there is a risk of retaliation from the whistleblower’s employer).
66.
See Anderson, 2012 WL 6087283 at *5 (stating that Anderson does not have a
right to the whistleblower award because it is merely discretionary, notwithstanding the risk
to his job from reporting the violation).
67.
See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 760–62 (discussing the history and
background of MARPOL 73/78).
68.
See Gullo, supra note 56, at 210 (discussing the principal sources of ocean oil
pollution); see also Kehoe, supra note 2, at 3 (comparing estimates of discharge-related
ocean oil pollution to the Exxon-Valdez catastrophe from 1989).
69.
See Andrew Griffin, MARPOL 73/78 and Vessel Pollution: A Glass Half Full or
Empty?, 1 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489, 489–90 (1994) (discussing the attention that
large events like Exxon-Valdez receive by the public and legislatures unlike the more
disastrous daily discharges when considered in their aggregate).
70.
Gullo, supra note 56, at 122–23.
71.
See Schulkin, supra note 13, at 112 (2002) (discussing all types of cruise ship
pollution and the effect that these pollutants have on the marine environment).
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repellent and body temperature maintenance properties of seabirds’
feathers, causing them to die from exhaustion or drowning.72 Oil ingested
during preening also has a significant impact on their digestive and
reproductive processes.73
The primary cause of ocean oil pollution is from ships’ daily
operational discharges in violation of MARPOL, rather than large
accidental discharges.74 The Exxon-Valdez released 37,000 tons of oil into
Prince William Sound off the coast of Alaska in 1989.75 The world
witnessed the worst ocean oil spill in history in 2010 when an explosion
occurred at the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico.76 This spill should not
be ignored as an extreme environmental catastrophe, nor should questions
regarding the safety and procedures of deep-sea resource extraction be
ignored. Nonetheless, the explosion and subsequent release of oil yielded
only approximately 660,877 tons of oil.77 Therefore, the crux of the ocean
oil pollution problem is from daily ship discharges in violation of
MARPOL.
E. How Have the Court’s Dealt with MARPOL/APPS Violations?
1. United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.78
United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. was one of the first
cases that the Department of Justice and the Coast Guard vigorously
72.
See id. (discussing the effects of ocean oil pollution on birds ability to repel water
and control body temperature)
73.
See id. (discussing the effects of ocean oil pollution on birds’ digestive and
reproductive systems).
74.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 3 (critiquing the lack of attention paid to discharge
based oil pollution compared with accident based oil pollution); see also Gullo, supra note
56, at 124–25 (discussing the ongoing battle with the illegal discharge of oil on the high
seas).
75.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 3 (“Arguably the worst ecological disaster in U.S.
history, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spilled approximately 37,000 tons of
crude oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska on March 24, 1989.”).
76
See BP Leak the World’s Worst Accidental Oil Spill, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London),
Aug.
3,
2010,
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7924009/BP-leak-theworlds-worst-accidental-oil-spill.html (discussing the blowout at the Macondo well in the
Gulf of Mexico) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
77.
See id. (stating that the spill at the Macondo well is estimated to have leaked more
than four million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico).
78.
See generally United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (denying defendant Royal Caribbean’s motion to dismiss claims under the
False Claims Act for providing an inaccurate ORB to the United States Coast Guard).
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pursued for violations of MARPOL/APPS.79 In Royal Caribbean, the
United States brought suit against Royal Caribbean cruise line for violating
the False Claims Act,80 instead of bringing suit for MARPOL violations,
because the MARPOL violation occurred outside of the United States
territorial waters.81 Therefore, the United States did not have jurisdiction to
prosecute the illegal discharge, but did have jurisdiction to prosecute
violations of the False Claims Act for actions inside the United States’
territorial waters.82
In February of 1993, the Coast Guard observed, via infrared
technology, the discharge of oil from the Nordic Empress, one of Royal
Caribbean’s many cruise ships.83 The discharge occurred in Bahamian
sovereign waters.84 When the Nordic Empress entered the port of Miami,
the Coast Guard investigated the illegal discharge and observed that the
ORB did not indicate the illegal discharge observed by the Coast Guard.85
Because the Nordic Empress sailed under the flag of Liberia, the
United States referred the violation to Liberia pursuant to international law,
practice, and MARPOL requirements.86 Liberia declined to prosecute
because there was reasonable doubt that a MARPOL violation occurred.87
After Liberia failed to prosecute Royal Caribbean for violating MARPOL,
the United States brought suit under the False Claims Act for presenting to
the United States Coast Guard a false ORB.88
Royal Caribbean argued that the United States does not have
jurisdiction to prosecute the illegal discharge in this case under MARPOL
because it occurred outside the United States’ territorial waters.89 Therefore,
79.
See William A. Goldberg, Case Note, Cruise Ships, Pollution, and International
Law: The United States Takes on Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 71, 71–
72 (2000–01) (discussing the Department of Justice’s novel arguments to find Royal
Caribbean liable and avoid violating international law).
80.
See False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2011) (imposing fines and
imprisonment for knowing and willful falsification or concealment of a material fact, false
representation, or false writing in a matter involving a federal entity).
81.
See Royal Caribbean Cruises, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (noting that while
jurisdiction for the MARPOL violation belonged to the flag state, Liberia, the government
had instead brought an FCA claim for the misleading ORB, over which the US did have
jurisdiction notwithstanding MARPOL).
82.
See id. at 1368 (“To the extent that the presentation of the materially false Oil
Record Book to the Coast Guard constitutes a separate, actionable crime under United States
law, MARPOL does not bar that prosecution.”)
83.
See id. at 1361 (reciting the facts of the case).
84.
See id. (reciting the facts of the case).
85.
See id. (reciting the facts of the case).
86.
See id. (reciting the facts of the case).
87.
See id. at 1361–62 (reciting the facts of the case).
88.
See id. at 1362 (reciting the history of the indictment).
89.
See id. (reciting the defendant’s motion to dismiss arguments).
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any prosecution would violate the terms of MARPOL, traditional maritime
law, and principles of international law.90 The government argued that
Royal Caribbean was not prosecuted for the illegal discharge in the
Bahamas, but for presenting a false ORB to the Coast Guard in a United
States port. The court agreed.91 Presenting the false ORB to the Coast
Guard is illegal under the False Claims Act, and the United States has
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed within its territorial
boundaries.92
The court found that the United States had jurisdiction over Royal
Caribbean for violations of the False Claim Act and that the prosecution did
not violate principles of international law.93 The court noted that “even if
the statement is arguably true at the time it was made in the location in
which it was made, if the statement is false as a matter of United States law
and fulfills the other requirements for § 1001 claim, it is actionable.”94 The
court then determined that if the government could substantiate the prima
facie elements of the False Claims Act claim, Royal Caribbean’s statements
could be actionable under the Act for providing an ORB that did not
include the illegal discharge observed in the Bahamas by the Coast Guard.95
2. United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd.96
In 2007 the District Court for the District of Maine held that the
court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute MARPOL violations by foreignflagged ships that do not occur within the United States’ territorial waters.97
The court held, however, that it does not lack jurisdiction to prosecute
violations of ORB maintenance requirements by foreign-flagged ships
when that ship is in the United States’ territorial waters.98 The court has the
power to adjudicate any MARPOL violation that occurs within the territory
90.
See id. (reciting the defendant’s motion to dismiss arguments).
91.
See id. at 1368 (“The discharge of oil in an improper manner is one crime; the
failure to keep an Oil Record Book as required under MARPOL/APPS is another; and the
deliberate presentation of a false material writing to the U.S. Coast Guard is another.”)
92.
See id. at 1368–69 (determining that MARPOL does not preclude an FCA claim).
93.
See id. (determining that MARPOL does not preclude an FCA claim).
94.
Id. at 1363–64 (citing United States v. Godinez, 922 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1991)).
95.
See id. (“If the [ORB] documents are [routinely used by federal officials], and the
prima facie requirements of the five elements of a § 1001 claim are met . . . then the
statement is action-able under § 1001.”).
96.
United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me. 2007).
97.
See id. at 38–39 (determining that, on these facts, the reasoning in Royal
Caribbean precluded the federal government from jurisdiction over the MARPOL
violation).
98.
See id. (determining that Royal Caribbean did, however, afford the government
jurisdiction for the separate offense concerning the ORB violation).
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of the United States, including ORB maintenance violations, even if the
discharge at issue in the ORB did not occur within the United States
territorial waters.99
In Petraia, the ship M/V Kent Navigator sailed under the flag of
Gibraltar and was owned by a Swedish company incorporated in the British
Virgin Islands.100 Petraia argued that the case should be dismissed because
the United States lacked jurisdiction to prosecute under MARPOL because
the alleged inaccuracies in the vessel’s oil record book
involve a discharge on the high seas outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, the actions constituting
the crimes alleged in the indictment occurred outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, which may not bring such
charges under MARPOL and [the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea].101
The court disagreed.102 Citing Royal Caribbean, the court
concluded that the criminal violation Petraia was charged with was not for
the illegal discharge of oil on the high seas under MARPOL, but for failure
to maintain an accurate ORB while in the United States territorial waters.103
By failing to maintain an accurate oil record book while in U.S. territorial
waters, Petraia violated MARPOL/APPS—which requires specifically
recording all legal and illegal discharges—giving the United States the
authority to prosecute violations.104 Therefore, jurisdiction in the District
Court of Maine was deemed proper.105 The court then specifically noted,
to find to the contrary would raise serious questions about
the government’s ability to enforce, as a matter of domestic
law, false statements made in connection with such matters
as bank fraud, immigration, and visa cases, where the false
statements at issue were made outside of the United States,
99.
See id. (discussing the jurisdictional status of the various violations).
100.
See id. at 36 (stating that the ship was registered with the government of Gibraltar,
owned by a corporation located in Sweden, and incorporated under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands).
101.
Id. at 36–37.
102.
See id. at 38 (relying on the reasoning in Royal Caribbean to reject defendant’s
argument).
103.
See id. (discussing the reasoning of the court in Royal Caribbean).
104.
See id. at 38–39 (“[T]he concurrent jurisdiction provision of MARPOL allowed
the United States to prosecute what was clearly a crime in and of itself: the presentation of a
false Oil Record Book to the Coast Guard.”).
105.
See id. (determining that the facts were not sufficiently distinct from Royal
Caribbean to justify foreclosing jurisdiction).
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perhaps acceptable or in the alternative unnecessary under
the appropriate foreign regulatory scheme, but nonetheless
illegal under United States law.106

3. United States v. Jho; United States v. Ionia Management; United States
v. Pena
Since Petraia the Fifth, Second, and Eleventh U.S. Circuit Courts
of Appeal have held that jurisdiction is proper for prosecutions of ORB
violations when the ship was in a United States port.107 In Jho, the
defendants argued the United States could prosecute only ORB violations
that had actually occurred within the United States under
MARPOL/APPS.108 The Fifth Circuit summarily rejected this argument,
focusing on the purpose and intent of MARPOL/APPS, to prevent oil
pollution at sea.109 The court stated:
Accurate oil record books are necessary to carry out the
goals of MARPOL and the APPS. If the record books did
not have to be “maintained” while in the ports or navigable
waters of the United States, then a foreign-flagged vessel
could avoid application of the record book requirements
simply by falsifying all of its record book information just
before entry into a port or navigable waters.110
If ship owners’ arguments were accepted, then the goal of
preventing ocean oil pollution would be undermined.111 Based on the Fifth
Circuits holding in Jho, ship owners, charters, and chief engineers have an

106.
Id. at 38 (quoting United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d
1358, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1998)).
107.
See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that under APPS
there is a duty to keep accurate ORB, violation of which could be prosecuted); United States
v. Ionia Mgmt., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding the same); United States v. Pena, 684
F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding the same).
108.
See Jho, 534 F.3d at 402–03 (discussing the defendant’s claim that because the
alleged misconduct was made in international waters, it was outside U.S. ports or navigable
waters).
109.
See id. at 403 (“[I]gnoring the duty to maintain puts the regulation at odds with
MARPOL and Congress’ clear intent under the APPS to prevent pollution at sea according
to MARPOL.”).
110.
Id.
111.
See id. (“We refuse to conclude that by imposing limitations on the APPS’s
application to foreign-flagged vessels Congress intended so obviously to frustrate the
government’s ability to enforce MARPOL’s requirements.”).
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affirmative duty to keep a properly maintained ORB at all times in United
States territorial waters.112
The defendants in Jho also argued that jurisdiction was improper
because it violated principles of customary international law and the United
Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS).113 The defendants
argued that the United States did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the
violations alleged because the ship in question, the M/T Pacific Ruby, was
registered in Liberia, and under the law of the flag, only Liberia had
jurisdiction to prosecute MARPOL violations by the defendants.114
The court rejected these arguments, asserting that the law of the
flag doctrine cannot be used as a shield from the jurisdiction of United
States courts.115 The court stated that, “it has long been established that a
state has the power to prosecute violations of its laws committed by
foreign-flagged vessels in its ports as long as the port state has not
abdicated authority to do so.”116 Because the prosecutions in Jho were for
violations of United States law, the violation of the ORB maintenance
requirements occurred within the United States territorial waters, and the
United States had not abdicated its sovereignty, the United States had
authority to prosecute Jho for failing to properly maintain the ORB.117
In Ionia Management,118 the Second Circuit addressed similar
questions for the first time.119 Ionia Management, a company incorporated
in Liberia and headquartered in Greece, owned the 600-foot oil tanker
named the M/T Kriton.120 The ship made numerous deliveries of oil to ports
along the eastern seaboard of the United States.121 During this period, its
chief engineers routinely discharged oily waste directly into the ocean by
diverting the waste around the oily water separator, none of which were
recorded in the Kriton’s oil record book.122 The Department of Justice
112.
See id. (“[W]e read the requirement that an oil record book be ‘maintained’ as
imposing a duty upon a foreign-flagged vessel to ensure that its oil record book is accurate
(or at least not knowingly inaccurate) upon entering the ports of navigable waters of the
United States.”).
113.
See id. at 405–06 (discussing this body of law).
114.
See id. (discussing the defendants’ arguments).
115.
See id. at 406 (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the law of the flag
doctrine does not completely trump a sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction to prosecute
violations of its laws.”).
116.
Id. at 408–09.
117.
See Jho, 534 F.3d at 409–10 (rejecting the idea that 33 U.S.C. § 1912 prevents
prosecution of the oil record book offenses charged against Jho).
118.
United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009).
119.
See id. at 303 (holding that a duty existed under APPS to keep accurate ORB,
violation of which could be prosecuted).
120.
See id. (reciting the facts of the case).
121.
See id. (reciting the facts of the case).
122.
See id. (reciting the facts of the case).
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indicted Ionia for thirteen counts of violations of APPS, one count of
conspiracy, three counts of falsifying records in a federal investigation, and
one count of obstruction of justice.123
While the circumstances of the investigation are not divulged in the
Second Circuit’s opinion, the court adopted the analysis of the Fifth Circuit
in Jho, finding that the district court had jurisdiction for the indictments that
were issued under MARPOL/APPS.124 Quoting Jho, the court noted that
[the] Supreme Court has recognized that the law of the flag
doctrine does not completely trump a sovereign’s territorial
jurisdiction to prosecute violations of its laws: The law of
the flag doctrine is chiefly applicable to ships on the high
seas, where there is no territorial sovereign; and as respects
ships in foreign territorial waters it has little application
beyond what is affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the
local sovereign.125
In the most recent case to address United States enforcement of
MARPOL, United States v. Pena,126 the Eleventh Circuit continued the
trend of upholding jurisdiction for prosecutions of MARPOL violations in
United States courts.127
In Pena, the defendant did not violate the ORB maintenance
requirement; however, Pena did violate MARPOL certification
requirements.128 While Pena does not involve a failure to properly maintain
an accurate ORB or an illegal discharge, the analysis of the court is
important and displays the reach of the holdings in Royal Caribbean,
Petraia, Jho, and Ionia Management.129
123.
See id. at 306 (reciting the basis for the indictments).
124.
See id. at 308 (“[T]he court [in Jho] found that the ORB offenses were charged ‘in
accordance with’ the law of the flag . . . . We agree for substantially the reasons stated by the
Fifth Circuit.”).
125.
Id. (citing United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 406 (5th Cir. 2008)).
126.
United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012).
127.
See id. at 1141–42 (“[W]e hold that the United States has jurisdiction to prosecute
surveyors for MARPOL violations committed in U.S. ports.”).
128.
See id. at 1143–44 (reciting the facts of the case).
129.
See United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that whether the United States has the authority to regulate
potentially illegal discharges or failure to properly update an ORB outside of United States
jurisdiction does not affect the United States Coast Guard’s ability to regulate maintenance
of an ORB inside U.S. waters); United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34,
38 (D. Me. 2007) (citing and agreeing with the holding from Royal Caribbean); Jho, 534 F.
3d at 404 (affirming that the gravamen of the action is not the illegal discharge but the
misrepresentation to the United States government); Ionia Mgmt., 555 F.3d at 309 (joining
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Hugo Pena was employed by the Universal Shipping Bureau as a
ship inspector and conducted ship inspections necessary to receive a
certification that the ship complied with MARPOL requirements.130 The
Island Express I changed its flag from St. Kitts and Nevis to Panama.131 In
order to comply with all necessary regulations it was required to have a new
IOPP certificate issued. The IOPP certificate is a certification under
MARPOL that indicates that a certified ship complies with the MARPOL
requirements for proper disposal of bilge water and other oily mixtures.132
Pena conducted the survey of the Island Express I and issued the
certification even though he was aware that the oily water separator was not
operational, and that the Island Express I’s engineer had fashioned a means
to pump the bilge water from the engine room directly to the ship’s deck.133
This system rendered the Island Express I ineligible for certification.134
Pena sought to dismiss the suit because he was issuing
certifications for Panama and not the United States.135 He argued that any
suit against him in the United States would offend notions of extraterritorial enforcement of the law.136 The Eleventh Circuit was not
persuaded, and concluded that because Pena was operating out of Miami,
Florida, and the certification was issued while the Island Express I was in
United States territorial waters, that the United States had adequate
jurisdiction to prosecute this particular violation of MARPOL.137 Pena’s
other arguments—that the indictment failed to allege he had a duty to
conduct a complete MARPOL survey, and that failure to conduct a survey
is not a crime—were also found to lack merit.138

the Fifth Circuit and holding that the APPS imposes a duty on ships to have an accurately
maintained ORB when entering a U.S. port).
130.
See Pena, 684 F.3d at 1143–44 (discussing the factual and procedural history).
131.
See id. at 1143 (reciting the facts of the case).
132.
See id. at 1142–43 (noting that the certificate is issued upon successful completion
of an inspection by the flag state, either on its own or through a designated “surveyor”).
133.
See id. at 1143–44 (reciting the facts of the case).
134.
See id. at 1142 (discussing the MARPOL requirements concerning bilge water
discharge).
135.
See id. at 1145 (discussing Pena’s jurisdictional argument).
136.
See id. (discussing Pena’s jurisdictional argument).
137.
See id. at 1145–46 (noting that a port state’s jurisdiction over matters occurring in
port is settled law and that MARPOL provides the flag state with mere concurrent
jurisdiction over such matters).
138.
See id. at 1147–48 (discussing and rejecting these arguments).
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III. Discussion

A. Use of the Whistleblower Provision of the APP as a Tool in Enforcing
MARPOL 73/78
The recent growth in enforcement proceedings under MARPOL
and APPS is partially attributable to the 1987 amendment to the APPS.139
The 1987 Amendment provided that a whistleblower may be able to receive
up to one half of the damages awarded in a successful prosecution for
MARPOL/APPS violations.140 Over the past ten years the United States
Department of Justice has significantly increased its use of this provision
and subsequently increased the number of prosecutions for MARPOL
violations.141 In 2010, for example, the number of vessel pollution case
referrals was double the ten-year annual average.142
This rise in prosecution and general enforcement has created a
sense of unease in the maritime shipping community.143 As the law firm
Chalos & Co.144 contends, there is a concern that many of these
whistleblowers are acting only out of spite for their employers or out of
139.
See Jeanne M. Grasso & Gregory F. Linsin, Blank Rome LLP, MARPOL
Enforcement in the United States, MARITIME PROFESSIONAL 8, 8–11 (May 2011), available at
http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=2471 (discussing the United
States enforcing compliance with the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships); see also Chalos & Co. P.C., U.S. Prosecution of Suspected MARPOL
Violations—Whistleblowers: Are they Really Reliable?, CHALOS & CO. P.C. (2011)
[hereinafter Chalos 2011], http://www.chaloslaw.com/us-prosecution-marpol-violations.html
(discussing the United States government’s prosecution of suspected MARPOL violations)
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
140.
See Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2008) (“A person who
knowingly violates the MARPOL Protocol, Annex IV to the Antarctic Protocol, this chapter,
or the regulations issued thereunder commits a class D felony. . . . [A]n amount equal to not
more than ½ of such fine may be paid to the person giving information leading to
conviction.”).
141.
See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 8 (discussing the United States’
aggressive enforcement efforts since the early 1990s); see also Brandon L. Garrett,
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1826 (Dec. 2011) (“Federal
prosecutors have increasingly prosecuted pollution on the high seas and not in U.S.
navigable waters.”).
142.
See Gullo, supra note 56, at 125 (discussing increased prosecution efforts).
143.
See Grasso & Liskin, supra note 139, at 9 (discussing the preventative measures
taken by vessel owners to foster increased compliance as a result of the increased pace of
enforcement).
144.
Chalos & Co. is an international law firm that specializes in maritime law, with a
special practice area devoted to MARPOL violation defense. See CHALOS & CO. P.C.,
MARITIME & MARPOL CRIMINAL DEFENSE, http://www.chaloslaw.com/maritime-criminaldefense.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (discussing the firm’s practice).
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personal greed.145 Chalos & Co. cites an incident from Corpus Christi,
Texas in which a whistleblower claimed that his vessel, the M/T Wilmina,
violated MARPOL.146 Upon receiving the tip, the Coast Guard detained the
ship pending further investigation.147 This investigation did not result in
charges under APPS or MARPOL.148 The detention of a ship and
subsequent investigation significantly impacts both the company and crew
from loss of revenues and daily pay.149
While Chalos & Co. presents a valid argument, they ignore the
necessity and importance of awarding whistleblowers. These awards are
particularly useful when it is difficult to detect violations of laws and
relevant treaties.150 Ocean pollution laws are perfectly suited for these
additional detection and enforcement measures.151 It would be an onerous
and prohibitively expensive task for the United States and every major
shipping country to have a fleet of ships dedicated solely to policing the
oceans for MARPOL violations.152 By employing a regulatory scheme that
relies on whistleblowers instead of a large enforcement apparatus, the
United States is able to enforce MARPOL more efficiently because it is

145.
See Chalos 2011, supra note 139 (“[W]histleblowers have been said to be
motivated to use the U.S. whistleblower program for self-serving purposes of revenge and
exacting large monetary rewards.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
146.
See id. (discussing a 2010 dispute between a whistleblower and a foreign-flagged
oil tanker, after the whistleblower reported a MARPOL violation).
147.
See id. (discussing the initial investigation for MARPOL violations).
148.
Awilco AS, Press Release May 28, 2010, “USCG Allegation Concerning
Violation Of Marpol Regulation By M/T Wilmina,” http://www.ship.gr/news6/awilco1.htm
(stating that the Coast Guard dropped charges against the ship, the crew, and the owner after
detaining the ship for twenty days) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
149.
See Ho-Sam Bang, Recommendations for Policies on Port State Control and Port
State Jurisdiction, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM. 115, 118–19 (Jan. 2013) (“Almost every vessel at
sea has tight schedules which are arranged by ship owners or charterers. Ship detention in a
port causes the owner or charterer of the vessel to lose money.”).
150.
See Stefan Rutzel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to
the Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
1, 34 (1995) (reasoning that whistle-blowers provide a necessary incentive to private
organizations, which tend to correct wrongdoing with minimal efforts and are reluctant to
investigate other environmental damage).
151.
See id. at 35, 43 (examining the “legitimate reasons” to maintain silence about the
illegal acts of others and why mandating whistleblowing will incentivize employees to come
forward, particularly in the area of pollution and environmental misconduct); see also Gullo,
supra note 56, at 134 (discussing the ways in which vessel polluters avoid detection).
152.
See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 46 (discussing the expensive approach of having the
government investigate and prosecute each violation); see also Gullo, supra note 56, at n.
100 (explaining the Coast Guard’s ability to detect oil spills and the costs associated with
detection).
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more economically viable.153 Therefore, in order to efficiently enforce
MARPOL oil pollution requirements, enforcement authorities must rely on
crewmembers that are willing to testify to the proper authorities, whether in
the United States or other MARPOL nations.154 Moreover, without this
information, the proper authorities would be hard pressed to have the
reasonable belief necessary to justify an in-depth examination and
investigation of a ship’s practices.155
Chalos & Co. is also concerned that whistleblower awards are too
large and therefore over incentivize crewmembers reporting violations to
the authorities, particularly those in the United States.156 The United States
prosecutions and settlement awards tend to be consistently greater than
those awarded by other MARPOL signatories; and because the United
States has high punitive damage awards, the possible reward for a
whistleblower is significant.157 The significance of a multi-million dollar
award is great when compared to the average ship crewmember salary of
$12,000 per year.158 Additionally, there are indications that whistleblowers
may hold information until their ship reaches the United States or a United
States port abroad, so as to be eligible for generous awards under United
States law.159
Grasso and Linsin recognize, however, that because the risks that
companies and ship owners take for violating provisions of MARPOL when
they enter U.S. ports around the world has increased, there is a trend of
153.
See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 35 (“[E]xternal whistleblowing helps to update
environmental data and to make government aware of problems in compliance, leading to
more efficient future regulation and a better determination of the crucial control issues.”);
see also Gullo, supra note 56, at 155 (“To some individuals involved with the maritime
industry and legal counsel representing the interests of vessel owners and operators, whistleblowers are considered ‘one of the U.S. [G]overnment’s biggest weapons’ in vessel pollution
prosecutions.”).
154.
See Gullo, supra note 56, at 155 (explaining the vital role that whistle-blowers
play in MARPOL prosecutions).
155.
See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 36 (explaining that actual violations are often
detected after a reported suspicion, even a false one, leads to an investigation).
156.
See Chalos 2011, supra note 139 (arguing that the credibility of whistleblowers
should be questioned due to the lucrative rewards available to them, thus potentially overincentivizing them); see also Grasso, supra note 139, at 8 (reporting that more than fiftypercent of new cases stem from whistle-blowers, most likely because of the lucrative
rewards).
157.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 49 (comparing MARPOL fines between
several countries).
158.
Compare Gullo, supra note 56, at 143–44 (discussing low crewmember wages)
with U.S. v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 311 (providing an award of $4.9 million
against the ship owner for MARPOL violations).
159.
See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 10 (discussing whistleblowers collecting
evidence to document the violation and waiting until they arrive back in the United states to
disclose the information).
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increased MARPOL compliance.160 For example, some companies have
adopted open reporting systems.161 In an open reporting system, a ship
owner provides hotlines or anonymous electronic reporting for
crewmembers that witness MARPOL violations.162 In some instances the
ship owner will provide an internal monetary award for reports of
MARPOL violations.163
Although the maritime industry is responding to United States
enforcement measures and is beginning to adopt policies to abide by
MARPOL and curb oil pollution (or any pollution of the ocean),164
enforcement by MARPOL nation authorities is necessary. Without
enforcement by the Coast Guard and the Department of Justice (and the
corresponding authorities in other MARPOL signatories), internal
procedures to comply with MARPOL more efficiently would not have been
adopted.165 Because compliance remains far from universal, enforcement
must increase both within the U.S and abroad.166
B. Effect of Department of Justice Enforcement of ORB violations on
Principles of International and Maritime Law
In many MARPOL enforcement cases, defendants argue that
enforcement of MARPOL in United States courts violates principles of
international and maritime law.167 The argument is that the courts are
reaching beyond their jurisdiction in permitting prosecution of ORB
violations because these have their roots in illegal discharges that occurred

160.
See id. at 9 (discussing the many ways companies have dedicated increased
resources to improve management practices for environmental compliance).
161.
See id. (explaining how some companies have decided to “augment the DPA
reporting system under their Safety Management System by providing open hotlines or
anonymous electronic reporting options to crew members whereby they can alert shoreside
management of environmental deficiencies or violations aboard a ship”).
162.
See id. (describing the benefits of an “Open Reporting System”).
163.
See id. (discussing the efforts of several companies instituting a monetary reward
system).
164.
See id. (explaining how vessel owners are on notice and have taken proactive steps
towards compliance).
165.
See id. (discussing the link between increased enforcement and increased efforts
towards compliance).
166.
See Gullo, supra note 56, at n. 16 (explaining that despite the increased
enforcement the level of noncompliance remains high).
167.
See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 2008) (arguing that
prosecuting a violation would violate the principles of international law); see United States
v. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (arguing that the
prosecution is inconsistent with the principles of MARPOL and the Law of the Sea
Convention of 1982 and would therefore upset the international legal regime).
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outside of United States jurisdiction.168 These arguments ignore the limited
nature and specific crimes that the United States successfully prosecutes.
The principles of comity and the law of the flag doctrine involve
the respect that nations provide to each other when enforcing laws against
citizens of other states.169 Comity is traditionally defined as “the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.”170 Law of the flag doctrine is
similar to the international law principle of comity. Under the Convention
on the High Seas, a state has jurisdiction over vessels that fly its flag, a
principle adopted from customary international law’s treatment of ships on
the high seas beyond any sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction.171 Comity
interacts with the law of the flag doctrine, in that a port state may, but need
not, refrain from exercising its rightful jurisdiction over actions taken in
port or territorial waters, yielding instead to adjudication by the flag state.172
From this doctrine, it is clear that there is a long-standing respect for the
laws and acts of other nations as part of traditional maritime law.173
It has been argued that the United States’ aggressive policy of
MARPOL enforcement violates the above traditional principles of
international and maritime law specifically enacted in MARPOL and the
APPS.174 If this is the case—that United States’ prosecutions are really
prosecutions for MARPOL violations occurring on the high seas—then the
United States is violating MARPOL, the law of the flag doctrine, and

168.
See Jho, 534 F.3d at 405 (reciting defendants’ argument that the United States
surrendered its jurisdiction to prosecute violations where the prosecution is not in
accordance with international law); see Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (reciting
defendant’s argument that a false statement concerning discharges made in Bahamian waters
was not within the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard).
169.
See Jho, 534 F.3d at 405–06 (defining the “law of the flag doctrine” and
discussing sovereign exercise of jurisdiction).
170.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
171.
See Jho, 534 F.3d at 406–08 (discussing the United Nations’ opinion on a vessels’
flag and a countries jurisdiction in enforcement against that country).
172.
See id. at 405 (discussing comity in admiralty cases).
173.
See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 169–70 (discussing the right of English courts to execute
foreign decrees in admiralty, recognized as early as 1607); see also Kathryn T. Martin,
Comment, U.S. Control Over Extraterritorial Water Pollution: The Interplay Between
International and Domestic Law, 22 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 209 (2008–2009)
(discussing a number of cases illustrating “a growing tendency in U.S. Courts to respect
international law and recognize it as a body of law that exists concurrently with U.S. law.”).
174.
See Martin, supra note 173, at 214 (discussing the Government’s position in Ionia
and its appearance of arguing the supremacy of U.S. law in regards to standards such as
MARPOL).
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traditional principles of comity.175 As Grasso and Linsin note, “none of the
recent MARPOL enforcement cases brought in the United States have
involved allegations of intentional pollution in U.S. waters.”176
MARPOL’s focus and goals must be considered when addressing
the principles of international law and comity. While it is undoubtedly
important to respect basic principles of international law, the United States
and the majority of major shipping nations in the world have all signed and
ratified MARPOL based on a belief that the pollution of our oceans is a
problem.177 Moreover, because MARPOL is not self-executing, every
nation is required to expressly draft and pass legislation enacting the
provisions of MARPOL.178 MARPOL requires legislation that enacts the
provisions of the treaty within a nation’s laws and indicates that the
signatory countries agree that the principles and goals are important and a
worthwhile venture.179
If the United States is violating principles of international and
maritime law, it may be necessary to increase the legitimacy of MARPOL
internationally and convince the other signatory nations that they ought to
do the same. Yet, because the world’s oceans must be protected, if other
MARPOL nations refuse or are unable to enforce MARPOL adequately,
then the United States must be the lone crusader acting to protect this
precious resource by whatever means necessary.180 If that requires
prosecutions of actual discharges on the high seas or extending the APPS to
include all discharges that occur within the United States economic zone,
then that is what the United States ought to do.
This argument—that the United States is distorting and violating
traditional principles of international and maritime law—also ignores the
175.
See generally United States v. Ionia Mgmt., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009)
(discussing the interaction of MARPOL and domestic law); United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d
398 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Me.
2007) (discussing the distinction between extraterritorial and jurisdictional violations);
United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(discussing the interaction of MARPOL and domestic law).
176.
Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 10.
177.
See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 22, at 547 (“The Parties . . . Recogniz[e] also the
need to improve further the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships,
particularly oil tankers . . . .”).
178.
See generally, Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (discussing the
definition of a self-executing treaty).
179.
See id. (discussing the requirements for a non-self-executing treaty to become
binding).
180.
See generally COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE GLOBAL OCEANS REGIME
(June 19, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/oceans/global-oceans-regime/p21035# (suggesting
several ways the United States could improve Ocean pollution, and the discussing the
successes of MARPOL enforcement) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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limited scope of the prosecutions brought against chief engineers and ship
owners.181 Both prosecutors and courts are careful to prosecute and punish
only MARPOL violations that actually occur in United States territorial
waters.182 Of the five cases discussed earlier, none of the crimes alleged or
charged were for the illegal discharge of oil or oily mixture, but rather only
for the failure to have a properly maintained ORB while in United States
territorial waters.183 As noted earlier in Jho, ship owners and chief
engineers have an affirmative duty when in the United States territorial
waters to have a properly maintained ORB.184
Moreover, in Royal Caribbean, the court noted that if Royal
Caribbean had properly recorded the improper discharge, no criminal
prosecution would continue, at least in the United States.185 The
enforcement of MARPOL ORB violations in the United States can have a
positive impact on both ocean pollution186 and the legitimacy of MARPOL
as a large multi-national treaty without violating the law of the flag doctrine
or principles of international law.187 If Royal Caribbean had recorded the
illegal action, it would have been far more difficult for their flag state,
Liberia, to ignore the violation.188
181.
See generally Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (charging chief engineer with records violation
and false statements in port); Petraia, 483 F. Supp. 2d 34 (charging company with records
violation and false statements in port); Ionia, 555 F.3d 303 (same); United States v. Pena,
684 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2012) (charging the compliance surveyor with conspiring to violate
records, failing to make required inspection, and false statements to Coast Guard officials);
Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (charging Royal Caribbean with records violation in
port).
182.
See Berg, supra note 6, at 257 (discussing United States jurisdiction over foreignflagged vessels)
183.
See generally Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (determining that the United States is able to
prosecute a failure to maintain an accurate oil record book); Petraia, 483 F. Supp. 2d 34
(same); Ionia, 555 F.3d 303 (same); Pena, 684 F.3d 1137 (same); Royal Caribbean, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 1358 (same).
184.
See Jho, 534 F.3d at 403 (describing the duty upon foreign-flagged vessels to
ensure that its oil record book is accurate upon entering the ports of navigable waters of the
United States).
185.
See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d. at 1371 (“[W]ere the Oil Record Book
accurate, in that it reflected any and all alleged illegal oil discharges, there would be no
possible §1001 prosecution in this action.”).
186.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 52 (noting that stringent enforcement,
inspection, and surveillance can be deployed simultaneously to effectively deter polluters);
see also Kehoe, supra note 2, at 3–4 (discussing the utility of federal sentencing guidelines
for imposing jail time on offenders who, absent U.S. prosecution, would be overlooked by
the “flags of convenience” states).
187.
See Martin, supra note 173, at 217–18 (noting that stronger enforcement efforts, in
which vital U.S. ports are a key part, fortifies the international legal regime).
188.
See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1361–62 (“Liberia filed its determination
that there was reasonable doubt that the Nordic Empress was in contravention of MARPOL
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By increasing the risk of prosecution for failure to have a properly
maintained ORB, and thereby enhancing the incentives for compliance with
MARPOL’s records requirements, the United States will be able to refer
cases to flag states with evidence that the flag state will be hard pressed not
to prosecute.189 With the potential for international backlash and shaming
from a failure to prosecute clear MARPOL violations by flag states, these
flag states of convenience will no longer be able to ignore the harm that the
shipping industry is doing to the oceans, which they aid and abet through
non-enforcement.190 In order for this to be successful, the United States and
other nations that collect evidence of MARPOL violations will have to
actively publicize this information in order to hold the refusing state
accountable in the eyes of the world. 191 This means that the United States
and other countries have the opportunity to help instigate MARPOL
prosecutions by other signatory nations by enforcing compliance with the
narrow ORB maintenance requirement.192
The United States policy of strict MARPOL enforcement is not a
violation of principles of extra-territorial enforcement because the treaty
and statute specifically address non-domestic conduct, making it
enforceable under its own terms.193 As Schoenbaum notes, “A criminal
statute may have extra-territorial effect if it is not limited to domestic
conduct by its terms and if legislative intent of extraterritorial application
can be inferred from its policy or legislative history.”194 MARPOL/APPS
limits prosecutorial jurisdiction over illegal discharges to those committed
and that it was ‘difficult’ to respond to the allegations of ‘improperly recorded’ Oil Record
Book entries under the facts as presented . . . .”).
189.
See id. at 1361–62, 1371 (noting that the U.S. prosecution was pursued only after
Liberia found favorably for Royal Caribbean, but that U.S. prosecution would have been
groundless if the ORB reflected the unlawful discharge).
190.
See Sandeep Gopalan, Alternative Sanctions and Social Norms in International
Law: The Case of Abu Ghraib, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 785, 786 (2007) (arguing that
shaming can be a powerful tool “to influence the offending state to take corrective action
and fill the enforcement gap in international law”).
191.
See id. at 820 (describing the success that Amnesty International has had through
collection and exposure of international law violations, and moral appeals to pressure
compliance).
192.
See id. at 813–15 (explaining that international agreement and compliance with a
social norm encourages other countries to comply in order to signal “respect for the rule of
law,” with an eye to future cooperative interactions); see also Martin, supra note 173, at
217–18 (noting that the international MARPOL regime would be strengthened by
multinational extraterritorial enforcement).
193.
See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (“[T]he extraterritoriality doctrine
providing jurisdiction over certain extraterritorial offenses whose ‘extraterritorial acts are
intended to have an effect within the sovereign territory’ seems applicable to this case.”).
194.
1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 152–53 (citing United States v. Williams, 617
F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980)) (emphasizing the importance of legislative intent when
determining whether a statute has extraterritorial effect).

278

5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 251 (2013)

in a nation’s territorial waters or by ships of its flag,195 but the United States
prosecutions at issue in these cases are not inconsistent with this
jurisdictional requirement.196 The actions that are prosecuted are violations
of domestic law occurring within the United States, and insofar as these
crimes entail violations of MARPOL, there is no requirement that these
prosecutions or cases be referred to flag states as this decision is left to the
discretion of the nation where the violation occurred.197 Therefore, even if
the MARPOL prosecutions at issue were extra-territorial, the United States
is justified in continuing to prosecute them.198
The argument that the United States is violating UNCLOS when
prosecuting ORB violations ignores that the United States, as a sovereign
nation, has the right to enforce its own laws within its own jurisdiction,199
even though parts of UNCLOS overlap with United States common law as
customary international law.200 In Royal Caribbean, even though the root
195.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(2) (“This chapter shall apply . . . with respect to Annexes
I and II to the Convention, to a ship, other than a ship referred to in paragraph (1), while in
the navigable waters of the United States.”).
196.
See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 398 (5th Cir. 2008) (alleging that Jho gave
false testimony to the U.S. Coast guard and knowingly failed to maintain an oil record
book); see also United States v. Petraia Maritime, Ltd., 483 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D. Me.
2007) (holding that the United States had jurisdiction to bring charges for having an
inaccurate ORB while in the United States’ navigable waters); United States v. Ionia Mgmt.
S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 2009) (joining the Fifth Circuit and holding that the APPS
imposes a duty on ships to have an accurately maintained ORB when entering a U.S. port);
United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1146 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wilson v. Girard, 354
U.S. 524, 529 (1957) (per curiam)) (“[T]he United States ‘has exclusive jurisdiction to
punish offenses against its law committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly
consents to surrender its jurisdiction.’”); Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (holding
that whether the United States has the authority to regulate potentially illegal discharges or
failure to properly update an oil record book outside of United States jurisdiction does not
affect the United States Coast Guard’s ability to police the maintenance of an oil record
book inside U.S. waters).
197.
See MARPOL 73, Art. IV(2) (stating that when there occurs “[a]ny violation . . .
within the jurisdiction” of a state party, that state must “[c]ause proceedings to be taken in
accordance with its law” if it does not turn evidence over to the flag state); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1908(f) (stating that where a ship sails under the flag of a foreign MARPOL signatory,
“the Secretary . . . may refer the matter to the government of the country of the ship’s
registry or nationality”) (emphasis added).
198.
See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (“[T]he extraterritoriality doctrine
providing jurisdiction over certain extraterritorial offenses whose ‘extraterritorial acts are
intended to have an effect within the sovereign territory’ seems applicable to this case.”
(quoting U.S. v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1985))).
199.
See id. at 1368 (noting that the federal government’s ability to enforce MARPOLviolating discharges in international waters “does not bear upon our inquiry as to whether the
United States has jurisdiction to enforce its [domestic] laws in port in Miami, Florida”).
200.
See 1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 24 (“With respect to the traditional uses of
the sea, therefore, the United States accepts the [Law of the Seas] Convention as customary
international law, binding upon the United States.”).
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cause of the crime was an illegal discharge under MARPOL, Royal
Caribbean was prosecuted for violations of the False Claims Act, a United
States law.201 No nation can be obligated to not enforce its own laws within
its own territorial limits against foreign individuals.202 Therefore, the
enforcement of ORB requirements is merely the United States applying the
laws of the United States against those who choose to avail themselves of
the United States territory and the United States ports.203
IV. What is the Correct Path Forward?
A. Practical Considerations and Realities of Large Multi-National Treaties
Because large portions of the oceans are not part of any sovereign
nation and because of the necessity of ocean travel, a multi-national treaty
addressing the ocean oil pollution is necessary.204 And as noted before,
without strict enforcement by all signatories, the treaty loses legitimacy and
power to accomplish its goal.205 In the case of MARPOL, the world is
interested in protecting one of the largest, if not the largest, natural
resources on the planet.206
The most effective solution to the problem of effective enforcement
of MARPOL is to create an international court that is the sole adjudicative
body for MARPOL violations.207 An international MARPOL court would
201.
See Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (“[C]ustomary international law
principles, which can be binding as a component of domestic law, require this Court to
consider UNCLOS as setting forth binding principles of international law.”).
202.
See id. at 1364 (“Under MARPOL . . . the United States . . . has the duty and the
obligation to board and inspect ships while in port and to pursue appropriate measures to
address any violations thereof.”); see also Amanda M. Caprari, Lovable Pirates? The Legal
Implications of the Battle Between Environmentalists and Whalers in the Southern Ocean,
42 Conn. L. Rev. 1493, 1513 (July 2010) (discussing the undeniable duty to enforce national
anti-piracy laws but not legal duty to enforce UNCLOS anti-piracy laws outside of a nations
territorial waters).
203.
See id. (discussing the application of the extraterritoriality doctrine).
204.
See 1 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 22 (explaining the unique nature of the law of
the seas as customary international law and the need for an enforcement mechanism); see
also DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 3–7 (listing the international conventions
that govern the law of the sea).
205.
See William Burke-White, Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
Law School, Transnational Law Institute Lecture Series (Jan. 31, 2013) available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMpCrZdsfag (arguing that treaties require strict
adherence by parties in order for them to bear meaning).
206.
See MARPOL 78 supra note 22, at 546 (describing the need to protect
international oceans from pollution).
207.
See Rebecca Becker, MARPOL 73/78: An Overview in International
Environmental Enforcement, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 625, 638 (1998) (describing the
need for solutions to MARPOL enforcement).
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have original jurisdiction for violations of all of the MARPOL Annexes and
avoid the difficulties of extra-territorial enforcement, traditional
international and maritime law principles, and comity from becoming a
barrier to enforcement in the United States or other courts.208
While an international MARPOL court as the exclusive forum for
MARPOL violations would be the most effective and efficient solution to
the problem of MARPOL legitimacy and actual enforcement power
associated with MARPOL,209 it would be unlikely to garner the support of
United States. The United States is unlikely to ratify and sign any
amendments to MARPOL that would attempt to remove jurisdiction from
its courts.210
The United States has traditionally been skeptical of international
treaties and even more skeptical of treaties that involve international courts
that could subject the country or its citizens to jurisdiction and possible
prosecution.211 Any proposal for an International MARPOL court would
not subject the United States as a sovereign nation to jurisdiction in this
court. It will still be difficult, however, to convince the United States
Congress to join an international MARPOL court, which would have
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens and corporations for environmental crimes
committed on the high seas, even if all concerns of due process are
answered in the court’s charter.212
Because an international MARPOL court is not practical, a
different solution is needed to deal with MARPOL violations. Any solution
will have to focus on increasing compliance by ships in their daily
operations and increasing the incentives to comply.213

208.
See id. (stressing the importance of improved intergovernmental enforcement in
enforcement of MARPOL).
209.
See id. (noting that this option circumvents the problem of voluntary compliance).
210.
See United States v. Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 (2006)
(describing the United States’ duty to enforce the compliance of laws in its sovereign
territory).
211.
See e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, The Nurembourg Paradox, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 151
(Winter 2010) (discussing and comparing the reasons for the French adoption of the
International Criminal Court Treaty with the United States’ failure to adopt and join the
International Criminal Court).
212.
See Becker, supra note 207, at 638–39 (noting that an international tribunal
“would only be effective upon the consent of MARPOL nations,” which likely prize
sovereignty too much to make such a tribunal politically feasible).
213.
See id. at 641–42 (stressing the importance of publicity, education, and directives
on ships about the need to protect the seas from illegal oil dumping).
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B. Who is the Proper Party to Prosecute?
In most of the cases discussed, the defendant is the ship owner that
has violated provisions of MARPOL.214 These ship owners have the deepest
pockets and the ability to pay high settlements or damages as well as front
potentially expensive litigation costs.215 Some have suggested, however,
that the prosecution of ship owners unfairly prejudices a company or
individual for the acts of the crew and often the chief engineer.216
Therefore, they argue that prosecutions should focus on the chief engineer
or the specific individuals responsible for the illegal discharge or ORB
violation.217
In addition to Linsin’s proposal to focus prosecutions on chief
engineers instead of ship owners, Kehoe has argued that the United States
Courts should use the illegal discharges from outside the United States
jurisdiction when sentencing those liable for MARPOL violations within
United States jurisdictions.218 He argues that this will increase the deterrent
effect.219 Increased punishment that may be applied for an ORB violation
will reduce the incentive for chief engineers to try to cut costs by illegal
discharges regardless of any explicit company policy to abide by all
provisions and requirements of MARPOL.220
214.
Compare Royal Caribbean, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1358 (prosecuting only corporate
ship-owner for crewmember malfeasance) with United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 398 (5th
Cir. 2008) (prosecuting corporate ship-owner and chief engineer for engineer’s
malfeasance).
215.
See Craig H. Allen, Proving Corporate Criminal Liability for Negligence in Vessel
Management and Operations: An Allision-Oil Spill Case Study, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 269, 270
(2010) (noting that corporate fines are often dismissed as an inconsequential penalty because
of their small size compared to the scope of a company’s business).
216.
See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 10–11 (noting that companies can be held
accountable for the actions of rogue employees simply because of mere inattention).
217.
See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 8 (arguing that the focus on companies
resulting from whistleblower charges distorts incentives and causes internal compliance
systems to atrophy); Cf. Justice Rakoff, A Conversation with Judge Rakoff (Mar. 1, 2013)
(on file with WASHINGTON & LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT)
(suggesting that for securities law violations, it is not the company that committed the crime
but the individual, so holding individuals liable for violations will have a stronger deterrent
effect).
218.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 25 (arguing that the extraterritorial oil dumping was a
predicate fact to prosecution of the ORB offense, thus constituting offense conduct justifying
heightened penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines).
219.
See id. at 40–42 (arguing that United States v. Abrogar undermined “the
significant deterrent effect that the risk of jail time can have on engineers who violate
MARPOL and APPS” and that such imprisonment is fair given engineers’ knowledge of the
risks of noncompliance).
220.
See id. at 40–41 (arguing that engineers make a variety of choices, including one
to falsify record books, for which independent punishment is an appropriate deterrent).
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Linsin, Grasso, and Kehoe all make valid points. If a ship owner or
charterer has a strict policy regarding compliance with MARPOL but the
ship’s engineer acts independently, holding the owner or the charterer liable
for refusal to comply with MARPOL or mere willful ignorance of the
actions of their engineering crew is problematic.221 Additionally, there is a
strong argument that if stopping MARPOL violations is the goal and
stricter enforcement is the means by which that is best accomplished, then
harsher sentencing for willful violations of MARPOL may be a legitimate
sanction.222
The argument that the chief engineer ought to be held ultimately
liable, however, does not account for actual facts in many, if not most,
cases.223 Chief engineers are under constant pressure to reduce costs from
the ship owner or the charter party and while the costs of compliance with
MARPOL are very low, this pressure to reduce costs will force an engineer
to find savings in any form available.224
Chief engineers are also in a particularly vulnerable position.
George Chalos of Chalos & Co. discusses the case of Ioannis Mylonakis, a
chief engineer aboard the M/T Georgios.225 Mylonakis was prosecuted
along with the ship owners for MARPOL violations; however, unlike the

221.
See id. at 41 (arguing that penalizing charterers for the actions of the chief
engineer or vessel crew is not an effective deterrent); see also Grasso & Linsin, supra note
139, at 10 (arguing for more efficient prosecutorial procedures in order to hold the most
culpable people responsible for MARPOL violations).
222.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 42 (“[T]here are statutes in addition to APPS with
Guideline provisions that can be used to authorize jail time sentences against chief engineers
and other supervisory crew members who pollute the world’s oceans with oily wastes.”).
223.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 4 (“Savings derived by not complying with the
IMO’s regulations leads to lower operating costs that can be used to derive an unfair
advantage in the notoriously competitive ship charter market.”)
224.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 41–42 (describing the economic pressures facing chief
engineers from corporate ship-owners); Andrew W. Homer, Red Sky at Morning: The
Horizon for Corporations, Crew Members, and Corporate Officers as the United States
Continues to Aggressive Criminal Prosecution of Intentional Pollution from Ships, 32 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 149, 167 (Winter 2007) (describing the pressures and responsibilities of the master
and chief engineer on ships).
225.
See Chalos & Co. P.C., Wrongly Accused Chief Engineer Takes Intentional
Polluters to Task, CHALOS & CO., P.C. (2012) [hereinafter Chalos 2012], available at
http://www.chaloslaw.com/wrongly-accused-chief-engineer.html (describing a lawsuit filed
by a chief engineer accused and acquitted of MARPOL charges) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also
Bob Rust, Chief Engineer Sues Owner, TRADEWINDS (Aug. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.chaloslaw.com/pdf/tradewinds-mylonakis-article.pdf (detailing Mylonakis’s
claim that his employer for allegedly scapegoated him for the company’s wrongdoing) (on
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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ship owners, Mylonakis was acquitted.226 Mylonakis sued the ship owner,
Styga, for malicious prosecution.227 Mylonakis alleged that Styga supplied
false information to the government in their plea agreement that led to his
indictment.228 On December 4, 2012, the District Court for the Southern
District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Styga on
Mylonakis’ malicious prosecution claim.229 This case displays the distinct
position of vulnerability that a chief engineer faces when both the ship
owner and the chief engineer are prosecuted for MARPOL violations.230 A
chief engineer is susceptible to prison sentences, unlike the corporate ship
owner,231 and the chief engineer is unlikely to have the same representation
that the ship owner does in order to defend their interests.232
Chief engineers are under enormous pressure from the ship owners
to keep daily operation costs down and are particularly vulnerable when
MARPOL violations are prosecuted.233 The ultimate responsibility in
maritime shipping situations ought to rest on the person or entity that has
ultimate authority.
Due to low enforcement and low penalties for violations there are
currently few incentives for compliance with MARPOL.234 One solution to
increase MARPOL compliance would be to not only find the company
226.
See Mylonakis v. M/T Georgios, 909 F. Supp. 2d 691, 703 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(noting that Mylonakis was acquitted, whereas the ship’s owners entered into a guilty plea
agreement).
227.
See id. at 699 (describing Mylonakis’s claims against Styga, including the claim
for malicious prosecution).
228.
See id. at 702–03 (describing the events that lead to Mylonakis’ indictment).
229.
See id. at 740–41 (ruling that Maylonakis had raised no genuine issues of material
fact to support a malicious prosecution claim).
230.
See Chalos 2012, supra note 225 (describing the position of the company and the
engineer relative to the lawsuit).
231.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 31–39 (identifying the statutes that allow prosecution
of individuals for MARPOL violations); see Rakoff, supra note 216 and accompanying text
(discussing penalties against the individuals engaging in criminal action).
232.
See Giuseppe Bottiglieri Shipping Co. S.P.A. v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 2d
1241, 1244–46 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that while the corporate ship owner haggled with
the Coast Guard over terms for the ship’s release from port, the chief engineer was charged
with making false statements).
233.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining ship company’s motivations to
fail to comply with dumping regulations in order to save money); see Chalos 2012, supra
note 225 (explaining a chief engineer’s lawsuit after being falsely accused of oil dumping for
which his employer was responsible).
234.
See Jane Korineck & Patricia Sourdin, Clarifying Trade Costs: Maritime
Transport and Its Effect on Agricultural Trade, 32 APPLIED ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND
POLICY
417,
417–18,
NO.
3
(2010),
available
at
http://aepp.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/3/417.full.pdf+html (describing the impacts trade
costs have on shipping and motivations to cut costs in various ways) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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liable for MARPOL violations but also find the individual owner or control
person of the company liable on a theory similar to corporate veil piercing
if the limited liability company was formed to defraud or if no evidence of
fraud on an individual liability theory similar to the one in United States v.
Park.235 By prosecuting the company as a corporation and the company
executive as an individual there will be an added deterrent effect through
high monetary fines against the corporation and potential prison and
individual monetary fines against the control person.236
It would also be useful to utilize chief engineers and ship captains
as witnesses and sources in these prosecutions by granting immunity to any
chief engineer or captain that provides evidence to the proper authorities
regarding MARPOL violations.237 By utilizing chief engineers and control
persons, prosecutors will have more access to company policies, both
explicit and implicit.238 The number of whistleblowers available to provide
evidence increases prosecutions.239 A focused increase in the number of
available whistleblowers and witnesses to MARPOL violations will create a
culture of MARPOL compliance within the industry and foster ship
owners’ use of inter-corporate regulation in order to avoid MARPOL
liability.240
235.
See Larry S. Kane, How Can We Stop Corporate Environmental Pollution?:
Corporate Officer Liability, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 303 (Fall 1991) (quoting United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)) (noting Park’s holding that “a corporate agent, through
whose act, default, or omission the corporation committed a crime, was himself guilty
individually of that crime”); see also Douglas S. Brooks & Thomas C. Frongillo,
Environmental Prosecutions: Criminal Liability Without Mens Rea and Exposure Under the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 79 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 16 (Jan. 2012) (“Thus, the
key component of the Park decision . . . has been specifically adopted in the environmental
law area, is the imposition of criminal liability on corporate officials who fail to prevent the
harm at issue, regardless of their direct involvement in bringing about such harm.”).
236.
In order for this argument to be one hundred percent effective a change in personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment for maritime cases is
required. For an in depth discussion of how the courts see personal jurisdiction in maritime
cases see generally, Steven R. Swanson, Fifth Amendment Due Process, Foreign
Shipowners and International Law, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 123 (Winter 2011) (arguing that
courts should reconsider Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to look at the nature of the
shipping business and benefits to the owners vessel of doing business in the United States to
show that a vessel owner or charterer has personally availed himself of doing business in the
United States and the courts should recognize that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due
process standards are not necessarily the same).
237.
See Kaine, supra note 235, at 315–16 (describing a hypothetical that illustrates the
relationship between a corporate officer and the agent executing the illegal act).
238.
See id. (noting that agents often have access to explicit and implicit corporate
policies).
239.
See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 8 (describing incentives for
whistleblowers who witness wrongdoing to report illegal oil dumping to authorities at U.S.
ports).
240.
See id. at 10–11 (explaining the overall goal of MARPOL compliance).
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In addition to relying on more whistleblowers, prosecutors ought to
increase the penalties they are seeking against the ship owners and charter
holders.241 Kehoe has argued against this view.242 In support of his
argument that current damage awards against companies, especially smaller
companies, are sufficient, he cites the $4.9 million judgment awarded
against Ionia Management.243 The evidence that the judgments have had a
positive effect on compliance and deterrence, however shows a different
picture. In a 2003 OECD report on MARPOL and enforcement, the OECD
argues specifically that even though the cost of compliance with MARPOL
is only two percent of daily operational costs and in the United States the
penalties awarded have been significant, compliance has not significantly
increased because the risk of being caught combined with the cost of a
successful prosecution still does not outweigh the cost savings of noncompliance.244
Increasing the possible financial penalty against a corporation will
also increase the award a whistleblower may be eligible to receive.245
Therefore, detection of violations by the proper authorities and deterrence
from non-compliance with MARPOL will both be increased at the same
time.246
The maritime industry may contend that an increase in the size of
penalties for MARPOL violations will both negatively impact the global
maritime industry and directly injure the United States maritime industry,
particularly major port cities.247 Yet, compliance with MARPOL is a
relatively low percentage of daily operational costs.248 Even though the
compliance costs are low, “the level of noncompliance with MARPOL
241.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 4 (outlining the financial benefits charter
holders receive by ignoring MARPOL violations that go unpunished).
242.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 41 (noting that “the level of noncompliance with
MARPOL remains unacceptably high” notwithstanding the already stiff penalties sought by
the Justice Department in MARPOL prosecutions).
243.
See id. at 41 (“[A]fter a jury conviction and a court imposed fine of $4.9 million
dollars in the Ionia case, the court prohibited the defendant’s vessels from returning to U.S.
ports until the corporate operator had installed certain pollution prevention equipment on
board all of its vessels.”).
244.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 44, 49–50 (comparing the operating costs to
fines and other costs associated with noncompliance).
245.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (allowing courts to award whistleblowers up to half the
nominal value of a MARPOL fine).
246.
See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 35 (indicating that further punishment increases
compliance through individual and general deterrence).
247.
See id. at 36 (discussing the negative impacts that whistleblowing may have on a
corporation financially).
248.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 44 (“Environmental compliance costs
represent approximately 1–2% of the total fixed costs (capital and operating costs) of the
respective vessels chosen in this simulation.”).
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remains unacceptably high, especially among operators of general cargo
vessels that tend to have tighter operating budgets and earn low freight
rates, leading to a greater temptation to cut all costs that do not directly
endanger navigation.”249 A two percent daily operating cost increase is
unlikely to derail and injure the maritime shipping industry.250 Moreover,
the United States economy is one of the largest in the world,251 and will not
see an end to the transatlantic shipping into its ports due to increased
enforcement and penalties for MARPOL violations when the cost of
compliance is only a minimal increase in daily operational costs.252
If the goal of MARPOL violation penalties is to deter discharges of
oil and other waste into the oceans,253 then the penalties must necessarily
have that effect. When the risk of prosecution and the cost of violation are
low, there is no deterrent effect. 254 In order for deterrence to work, the risk
of prosecution and the cost of the penalty must both be prohibitively
high.255 Otherwise companies will continue to focus on their balance sheets
and look to save that two percent a day.256 As the OECD report indicates,
the cost of compliance is negligible, yet, compliance is still a problem.257
This increase in penalties must cause the maritime shipping industry to ask,
“to comply or not comply?”
C. The Whistleblower’s Role in Increasing United States Enforcement
To increase effective enforcement of MARPOL in the United
States an increase in detection through increased use and possibly change of
249.
Kehoe, supra note 2, at 41.
250.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 44 (describing the minimal impact of overall
environmental cost compliance).
251.
See Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: Stock of Foreign Direct
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
available
at
Investment
–
At
Home,
THE
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank.html
(listing the number of investments made domestically by citizens of other countries, which
can be used to determine the size of the international market directed towards the home
country) (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
252.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 44 (showing daily compliance costs as a
proportion of operating costs).
253.
See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 26, at 62 (“Recognizing also the need to improve
further the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships, particularly oil
tankers . . . .”).
254.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 47 (noting that some operators believe that
MARPOL violations are worthwhile because of the low probability of being caught).
255.
See id. at 49 (arguing that where fines are low, operators can simply consider this
the cost of doing business).
256.
See id. at 45 (discussing the financial incentives for operators in tight markets).
257.
See id. at 44 (discussing the limited impact of compliance).
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the whistleblower award provision in the APPS is necessary.258 While
increased use of various technological means should not be discounted, low
flying planes with infrared detectors and unmanned drones are all expensive
tools that require a significant investment by the United States government
both in equipment and in man-hours.259 This is not the case for
whistleblowers.
The United States can increase incentives for whistleblowers by
reducing the risks they may undertake by coming forward to the Coast
Guard or other individuals.260 One way to reduce these risks is to change
the whistleblower provisions in the APPS to remove the discretion that the
courts have in criminal cases and that the Secretary of Defense or
Administrator of the EPA has in civil cases relating to awards.261 By
making whistleblower awards mandatory, the whistleblower will no longer
fear coming forward, due to the possibility of losing his or her job, losing
weeks of work while he or she is sequestered for trial proceedings, and
losing the possibility of future employment without receiving compensation
for the risks they have undertaken.262 All of these events may still happen,
but a significant whistleblower award as provided for in APPS allows a
potential whistleblower to take these risks without necessarily affecting his
or her ability to provide for him or herself and his or her family.
Increasing the use of the whistleblowers as part of an enforcement
strategy is the best approach for a variety of reasons. While external
monitoring through airplanes or drones may yield good results, it is not as
economically efficient or feasible as rewarding those with inside knowledge
258.
Jeanne Grasso & Gregory Linsin, Furthering Compliance or Compromising
Compliance Programs? Whistleblower Rewards, 73 MAR. REP. 18, 20 [hereinafter Grasso &
(June
2011),
available
at
Linsin,
Furthering
Compliance]
http://www.marinelink.com/magazines/archive.aspx?MID=3 (“By implementing the
enhanced compliance and verification measures discussed above, companies may be able to
avoid becoming the government’s—and the whistleblower’s—next target.”) (last visited
Nov. 23, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
259.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 7 (indicating that Coast Guard cutters and airplanes
equipped with forward looking infrared radar are effective means of patrolling the coast line
at night).
260.
See Jenny Lee, Note, Corporate Corruption & The New Gold Mine, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 303, 317 (Fall 2011) (“Due to its inherent risks, whistleblowing, to some extent, should
be incentivized through regulatory policies that ‘encourage individuals to break the code of
silence in corrupt organizations.’”).
261.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1908(a) (“In the discretion of the court, an amount equal to not
more than ½ of such fine may be paid to the person giving information leading to
conviction.”).
262.
See Anderson v. United States, 2012 WL 6087283, *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012)
(dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, leaving the plaintiff, a
whistleblower, without any sort of compensation despite the risks he had taken).
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of the inner workings of the ship on a day-to-day basis.263 Additionally,
potential witnesses and whistleblowers are on every ship, whereas it would
be nearly impossible for any other detection method, without significant
costs both in equipment and man power on a day to day basis, to cover the
entire territorial waters of the United States and every ship therein.264
The Coast Guards ability to detect violations of MARPOL expands
with increased penalties, increased whistleblower awards, and with a
corresponding increase in guarantees that whistleblowers will receive an
award.265 These policies will raise the risk and the cost of non-compliance,
creating an environment where compliance is no longer a question.266
D. Arguments in Favor of Extra-Territorial Enforcement
Prosecutors should be allowed to pursue prosecutions for violations
that occur outside the United States territorial waters. While it has been the
case that the law of the flag doctrine has limited prosecution efforts to ORB
violations, the United States is not necessarily bound to the law of the flag
in every situation.267
The law of the flag is not an absolute rule, but rather a conditional
268
rule. The law of the flag doctrine may be ignored if public policy
outweighs the competing policy governing the law of the flag or if a foreign
registration and incorporation of a ship and its owner are a mere façade to

263.
See Rutzel, supra note 150, at 34 (“Whistleblowing leads to increased compliance,
either voluntary or enforced, without demanding additional public funds for supervision,
detection, and evidence gathering.”).
264.
See Gullo, supra note 56, at 144 (“APPS’s whistle-blower provision provides DOJ
with a cooperating witness (albeit a witness with a monetary incentive to testify) that it can
use as either pretrial leverage or as live testimony at trial.”); see also Chalos & Parker, supra
note 6, at 232 (“However, the government’s most effective ‘secret weapon’ in the war
against MARPOL violations is the use of ‘whistleblowers,’ most of whom are current or
former crewmembers.”).
265.
See Grasso & Linsin, Furthering Compliance, supra note 258, at 18 (stating that
open reporting systems to anonymously disclose violations are among the most effective
means of detecting MARPOL violations).
266.
See Grasso & Linsin, supra note 139, at 8 (“[P]rosecutions [of MARPOL
violations] are now yielding higher penalties, jail time and the banning of ships from United
States ports.”).
267.
See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 75 (“Accordingly, Story declared that the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States is not limited either by the
restraining statutes or the judicial prohibitions of England . . . .”).
268.
See id. (stating that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is dependent on several
factors).
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avoid the laws of a specific nation.269 In these situations the substantive law
of the United States may be applied.270
The important policy goals of MARPOL, the protection of our
oceans, weigh heavily in favor of extra-territorial enforcement.271 Therefore
courts should allow prosecutions for any discharges that occur on the high
seas or for actual discharges that occur and are not properly recorded in an
ORB.
The United States should not seek to immediately prosecute
MARPOL violations that occur outside of the United States’ territorial
waters. In order to foster international cooperation and international
relations, it is good policy to initially abide by the MARPOL referral
provision, where cases are referred to the flag state initially.272 If a flag
state, such as Liberia or the Bahamas, refuses or fails to prosecute
violations of MARPOL and the Coast Guard or Department of Justice have
provided clear evidence that a violation has occurred, then public policy in
favor of protecting our oceans outweighs any concerns of comity and
international law.273 Without the enforcement of MARPOL and legitimate
penalties for failure to abide by MARPOL,274 the policy that our oceans
deserve protection and the treaty seeking to provide that protection lose all
meaning.275
Moreover, when the Department of Justice has been given a case, it
should be on the lookout for incorporation and registration that is a mere
façade.276 If all indications are that the corporation is a shell, then the
269.
See id. at 264 (listing a variety of factors that go into conflicts and choice of laws,
including the place of the wrongful act, the domicile of the injured, the allegiance of the ship
owner, the place where the contract of employment was made, forum non conveniens, etc.).
270.
See Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 653 (4th Cir. 1960)
(“However, if the law of the flag is to control, the flag must not be one of convenience
merely but bona fide.”); see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admiralty § 105 (2013) (“The law of the flag
may also be disregarded when foreign registration and incorporation are a mere façade to
avoid the consequences of U.S. shipping laws.”).
271.
See MARPOL 78, supra note 22, at 62 (stating the policy goals of MARPOL,
which include the protection of the ocean through enforcement and regulatory means).
272.
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COAST GUARD: ENFORCEMENT
UNDER MARPOL V CONVENTION ON POLLUTION EXPANDED, ALTHOUGH PROBLEMS REMAIN
19 (1995) (discussing federal policy on flag state referral).
273.
See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Admiralty § 105 (“However, the law of the flag is not absolutely
controlling, and will not be applied where considerations against its application outweigh
those in its favor, as in the instance where public policy dictates that the law of the forum be
applied.”).
274.
See generally COST SAVINGS, supra note 5 (discussing the role of legal penalties
vis-à-vis the economics of the shipping industry).
275.
See Burke-White, supra note 205 (noting that treaties become meaningless without
the deference of, or enforcement by, signatory parties).
276.
See Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 653 (“However, if the law of
the flag is to control, the flag must not be one of convenience merely but bona fide.”); see
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United States should seek to prosecute and gain jurisdiction as the flag state
when possible.277
Through novel legal arguments278 and expanding jurisdiction for
MARPOL prosecutions,279 the Department of Justice will be able to enforce
MARPOL more broadly and successfully prosecute more than mere ORB
violations. Therefore, the policy goals behind MARPOL, to reduce the
pollution and damage to our oceans, will be furthered.280
E. Increasing MARPOL’s Legitimacy as a Multi-National Treaty
Professor William Burke-White from the University of
Pennsylvania School of Law argues that a major impediment to the
legitimacy of large multinational treaties is the failure of enforcement by
signatory nations.281 MARPOL is subject to this problem.282 Therefore, the
legitimacy of MARPOL as a multinational treaty is in question.283
The United States can increase the legitimacy of MARPOL and
help promote consistent enforcement of MARPOL by other signatories by
continuing to aggressively prosecute MARPOL violations of U.S. flagged
and foreign-flagged vessels that enter U.S. ports.284 The majority of ships
that sail through the Gulf of Mexico are foreign-flagged.285 If the United
also 2 AM. JUR. 2D. Admiralty § 105 (“The law of the flag may also be disregarded when
foreign registration and incorporation are a mere façade to avoid the consequences of U.S.
shipping laws.”).
277.
See Shaun Gehan, Note, United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.: Use of
Federal “False Statements Act” To Extend Jurisdiction Over Polluting Incidents Into
Territorial Seas of Foreign States, 7 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 167, 168–69 (2001)
(“[A]pplications of domestic law are entirely consistent with the aims of the applicable
international treaties and offer a viable means of protecting the marine environment,
particularly when flag States themselves are hesitant to act.”).
278.
See id. (arguing that domestic law can be applied to matters within the jurisdiction
of another sovereign in order to effect the aims of conventional international law); see also
Berg, supra note 6, at 277 (“Issues of international comity may be raised by the expanded
enforcement jurisdiction.”).
279.
See generally Berg, supra note 6 (discussing the DOJ’s efforts to expand US reach
in MARPOL cases).
280.
See MARPOL 78, supra note 22, at 1 (laying out the policy goals of MARPOL).
281.
See Burke-White, supra note 205 (discussing ways to improve treaty legitimacy).
282.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 52 (noting that the absence of any of the
specified enforcement factors “increases the facility with which substandard operators can
breach international environmental regulations”).
283.
See Burke-White, supra note 205 (discussing the importance of enforcement to
treaty legitimacy).
284.
See COST SAVINGS, supra note 5, at 6 (arguing that greater penalties are
necessary).
285.
See Brian Baker, Comment, Flags of Convenience and the Gulf Oil Spill:
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 687, 713 n.184 (Summer 2012)
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States prosecutes the foreign-flagged ships that have violated MARPOL,
specifically targeting nations that have lax MARPOL enforcement, the
world will take notice.286 This will potentially embarrass these nations that
refuse to enforce MARPOL and lead these nations to begin devoting
resources to MARPOL enforcement.287
Additionally, if other nations do not increase their enforcement, the
role of the United States with respect to ocean oil pollution may need to
change to indicate the United States’ commitment to the protection of the
world’s oceans and the importance of MARPOL as a multi-national
treaty.288
F. Economic Practicalities of Consistent Enforcement
This Note has advocated for stricter enforcement of MARPOL by
all MARPOL parties. This Note has not yet addressed the costs related to
investigation and enforcement of MARPOL. Investigating and monitoring
of the oceans for violations of MARPOL is an expensive endeavor.289 It
requires the use and maintenance of at least a small naval fleet as well as
the prosecutorial resources of a well-funded government attorney’s
office.290 Many of the active flag states encourage ship owners to register
their vessels in order to help that state’s economy.291 These flag states are
not major economic power houses292 and do not have the resources to
(looking at statistics to show the impact that foreign-flagging has on the U.S. and
neighboring economies).
286.
See George D. Gabel Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an
International Solution to Modern-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1453 (June 2007)
(stating that prosecution of criminal acts aboard foreign-flagged ships is necessary to protect
the international maritime community).
287.
See Andrew Rakestraw, Open Oceans and Marine Debris: Solutions for the
Ineffective Enforcement of MARPOL Annex V, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 383,
404–08 (2012) (discussing lax and ineffective enforcement by other countries, which would
necessitate more rigid action); see also Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting:
Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 270–82 (Nov. 2011)
(explaining enforcement generally and how it can be used to persuade others to act).
288.
See Chalos & Parker, supra note 6, at 226 (discussing at several points the
increased aggressiveness of the United States government in pursuing these violations)
289.
See Garrett, supra note 141, at 1849–50 (explaining how violators are often
foreign corporations, which are able to avoid detection, which makes investigation more
difficult and expensive).
290.
See Kehoe, supra note 2, at 7 (implying that Coast Guard cutters are necessary and
effective at monitoring for MARPOL violations on the coastline).
291.
See Baker, supra note 285, at 695–99 (discussing the advantages provided to shipowners by flag of convenience states, and noting that in Liberia’s case, ship registration fees
account for eight percent of the country’s GDP).
292.
See International Transport Worker’s Federation, FOC Countries, ITF GLOBAL,
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/flags-convenien-183.cfm (last visited Oct. 1,
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monitor the oceans, let alone have a navy of their own that would provide
them with the tools to monitor violations of MARPOL effectively.293
With the modern proliferation of flags-of-convenience,294 the
ability to enforce MARPOL by flag states is becoming increasingly suspect
because of the high costs associated and the lack of wealth and resources
that flag states have.295 Therefore, in order to increase MARPOL
enforcement and reduce ocean pollution a solution to the high costs of
enforcement is necessary. One solution is to create an international fund
that is designed to help fund flag states that are less affluent build the means
and have the means to properly investigate and prosecute MARPOL
violations.296 Another solution would to provide the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) with more power over enforcement within the high
seas.297 Providing the IMO with a centralized enforcement power may
receive similar objections to an international MARPOL court.298 If the IMO
has a centralized prosecutorial power like INTERPOL and there is a way to
fund the court proceedings while granting due process rights, this would be
the ideal solution. Regardless of the solution that is adopted, a means by
which enforcement can be easily carried out is necessary if the goals and
aspirations of MARPOL are to be met.
V. Conclusion
The lofty goals of MARPOL and the APPS to eradicate ocean
pollution are both admirable and necessary. Without strict enforcement of
the entire treaty covering oil pollution, air pollution, hazardous wastes,
2013) (listing thirty-four small flag states, including Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, etc.) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
293.
See Baker, supra note 285, at 689–90 (describing how responsibility for the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig was the responsibility of the Marshall Islands, an extremely small
and underdeveloped island in the South Pacific, which was forced to outsource compliance
of safety to an outside corporation).
294.
See id. at 692–96 (discussing the development of flags of convenience states).
295.
See id. at 689–90 (discussing the shortfalls of having the Marshall Islands as a flag
state)
296.
See generally Susan Bloodworth, Death on the High Seas: The Demise of
TOVALOP and CRISTAL, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVL L. 443 (1998) (detailing the now defunct
funds for oil spill cleanup Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil
Pollution (TOVALOP) and the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker
Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL), which are similar to this proposal).
297.
See Becker, supra note 207, at 638 (“A radical option to
improve environmental enforcement would be to empower the IMO with the authority
to enforce compliance.”).
298.
See id. (noting that allowing IMO to enforce and police MARPOL violations is
problematic because of issues like funding and sovereign immunity).

